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Muzzling and Caging Administrative Law Judges: The
Social Security Administration Attempts to Control its
Most "Notorious" Employees
By Allen E. Shoenberger*
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has published
proposed rules' that will seriously impact the ability of federal
administrative law judges (ALJs) to speak, write, or become
associated with various groups without prior approval from the
agency upon thirty days notice.2 Several aspects of the proposed
rules are quite disturbing both from the perspective of United States
constitutional law and from the perspective of public policy. Among
other problems, the proposed rules impose prior restraints on the
ability of ALJs to speak, write, and associate with other Americans,
despite the profound commitment in First Amendment jurisprudence
against such prior restraints. Moreover, these prior restraints are
imposed without a serious attempt to justify the need for such
limitations.
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago, School of Law.
1. Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Social
Security Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 7192 (proposed Feb. 11, 2005) (to be
codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102).
2. The proposed rules are not limited in application to ALJs but indeed, apply
to all SSA personnel. However, this article concentrates its analysis on ALJs for
two main reasons: First, the proposed rules apply in a more automatic way to ALJs;
and second, as a practical matter, the major controversies involving SSA over the
last several decades have largely involved the cadre of ALJs, not other SSA
employees, so the rules are more likely to be actively applied to ALJs than other
SSA employees.
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Putting aside aspects of the rules that appear to portray
administrative law judges as a kin to Bonnie and Clyde, 3 ALJs are a
valuable resource for our society because of their training,
experience, and perspectives. To muzzle them, as these proposed
rules do, does a great disservice to American citizens. It is
particularly disturbing to realize that many ALJs have backgrounds
of service in the U.S. armed forces.4 They were willing to die for
their country, but now they are not being trusted to speak to their
country.
Unfortunately, this appears to portend yet another round in the
continued battles between the high level administrators of the SSA
and ALJs that decide social security disability cases.5 There is a
significant history of such conflict going back decades. In the 1980's
the SSA implemented a "Bellmon review program" which initially
targeted for case review SSA ALJs with high grant rates in disability
cases. 6 That program produced "a significant furor in Congress, the
courts, the states and the disability bar.",7 In hindsight it is pretty
3. 70 Fed. Reg. at 7193 ("Due to their heightened notoriety by the public as
compared to other SSA employees .... ). Why such loaded language was chosen
by the SSA is unclear.
4. Because of the veteran's preference accorded to applicants for ALJ
positions, virtually the entire corps of SSA ALJs are veterans, mostly male
veterans. Discrimination against women has become an issue in this context. See
Elaine Golin, Note, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in
Administrative Adjudication, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1532 (1995); Special Committee
on Gender, The Litigation Process in This Circuit, 84 Geo. L.J. 1702, 1770-71 nn.
179-82 (1996) (men were 93.1% of the administrative law judges in the District of
Columbia while 21% of the bar of the federal district court were female at the same
time).
5. In the 1980s the Bellmon review program implemented a statutory
requirement to "implement a program of reviewing, on the [Secretary's] own
motion," AU decisions in the disability insurance program. Social Security
Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304(g), 94 Stat. 441, 456
(1980).
6. As initially implemented, ALJs with high allowance rates were targeted for
review with half of their decisions reviewed on their own motion by the Office of
Hearings and Appeals, and over seven percent of their decisions by the Appeals
Council. ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., CASES AND COMMENTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 389 (10th ed. 2002).
7. For a review of the political history of disability in the 1980 - 1985 period,
see Jerry L. Mashaw, Disability Insurance in an era of Retrenchment: the Politics
of Implementing Rights, in SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS,
clear that the SSA overreacted with the Bellmon review program and
was forced to back off.8 Eventually review was made random
without targeting any particular group of ALJs and the controversy
subsided somewhat.
Serious conflict then arose between SSA and ALJs over another
SSA policy, that of "non-acquiescence." SSA instructed ALJs to
disregard applicable decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals
when those decisions conflicted with the Secretary's policies. 9 In
other words, ALJs were instructed to ignore controlling law. The
SSA's activities in adopting its non-acquiescence rule were described
as "explosive."'10 ALJs reacted with outrage to orders which were
understood to "ignore" the law. Potential explanations for such
multiple, public, heated controversies about SSA actions include the
massiveness of the regulatory program, the problems of processing
thousands of cases, the vulnerability of the claimant groups and the
political visibility of the issues."
Since the brouhahas of the 1980s and 1990s, none of these latter
factors have changed. The Social Security Disability determination
system remains one of the largest adjudicatory systems in the
world.' 2 Even appeals from initial ALJ decisions to the Appeals
Council remain enormous. 13 By contrast, federal district courts
(Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, eds., (1988); see also Jerry L. MASHAW
ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 499 (5th Ed.
2003)).
8. See Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d. Cir. 1989) (litigation generally
challenging the Social Security Administration's efforts to improve "the quality
and efficiency of the work of Administrative Law Judges"). The court in Nash
noted that policies designed to encourage a reasonable degree of uniformity are to
be encouraged so long as they do not directly interfere with "live" decisions except
insofar as the usual administrative review is performed by the Appeals Council. Id.
9. See Steiberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated and
remanded, 801 F.2d 29 (2d. Cir. 1986).
10. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 6, at 931.
11. Id.
12. In 2003, SSA ALJs disposed of 602,009 cases (virtually all after a hearing
or trial before the ALJ), but had 586,895 pending cases at the end of the year.
SSA, Annual Statistical Supplement, SSA (2003), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2003/. Normally these
involve an actual trial hearing, although most hearings are an hour or less.
13. Id. The Appeals Council disposed of 99,045 cases, with 59,781 pending at
the end of the year. The words "Appeals Council" are slightly misleading. In fact,
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(Article III courts) tried only about two percent as many cases in
Fiscal Year 2003 and in total dispositions terminated about half as
many cases that year as did SSA ALJs. 14 Disability claimants remain
just as vulnerable; the system remains just as complex.
In attempting to administer so vast an adjudicatory system as the
Social Security Disability Determination System, it is not surprising
that various tensions emerge between the cadre of ALJs and the
upper SSA. Judges want to function as judges, deciding individual
cases correctly and obeying controlling law. High level
administrators are concerned with cost, management of an enormous
bureaucracy, and case through-put. However, these factors alone fail
to explain the acrimony that has arisen between the ALJ corps and
high level SSA administration over the years. Only one other cadre
of federal employees has had similar difficulties: federal air traffic
controllers.
Nor should it be surprising that SSA attempts to avoid potential
embarrassments from its employees. Other federal agencies have
tried to control their employees' speech by cumbersome prior
approval mechanisms. For example, the Federal Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) attempted to distinguish between an
employee receiving travel expenses from private entities for
unofficial speeches or writing engagements concerning the subject
matter of the employee's work. If the agency pre-approved the
speech or writing, the employee was permitted to accept
reimbursement.' 5 If the agency did not, the employee was not
permitted to receive expense money. 6 The United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (en banc) held these regulations invalid
as conflicting with the First Amendment rights of the employees.' 7
The EPA was concerned with perceptions of private gain from such
in virtually all cases decided by the Appeals Council, only one ALJ at the Appeals
Council level looks at a particular case. In some instances a second ALJ at the
Appeals Council level will examine a case, but the notion of an en banc or
collective panel, as suggested by the title, is simply wrong.
14. Federal district courts held 12,948 civil and criminal trials in FY 2003.
Total dispositions in FY 2003 were 318,643. News Release, Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts, March 16, 2004.
15. Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
16. See id.
17. Id. at 99.
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use of public office.' 8 The en banc court stated: "We doubt that a bus
ticket to Baltimore and a box lunch en route could possibly be
construed as using public office for private 'gain,' yet they would be
equally as offensive to the challenged regulations as a lobster and a
Lear jet to Lake Tahoe."' 9
More important than the details of the proposed rules are the
general principles of law that might be applicable to curtailing or
limiting the activities of ALJs.20 The Social Security ALJs are
among the persons most knowledgeable about the practical operation
of the massive, complex social security disability scheme. Even if
these particular proposed rules were to be retracted, the principles
discussed herein would be just as applicable to any subsequent rule
proposals.2
I. THE PROPOSED RULES: THE CONTENTS
The proposed rules are rules intended to supplement the Office of
Government Ethics (OGE) Standards of Ethical Conduct for
Employees of the Executive Branch (effective February 3, 1993).22
The OGE standards already prohibit outside employment of an
executive branch employee in an activity related to the employee's
governmental duties as well as compensation for teaching, speaking,
or writing on matters relating to official duty.23 The OGE standards
18. See id.
19. Id. at 97-98.
20. And other governmental employees as well.
21. For example, it would appear that any rule limiting speech of ALJs
concerning their employment activities would likely touch off the highest scrutiny
requirements implicated by First Amendment jurisprudence, strict scrutiny,
requiring the government to demonstrate both a compelling state interest for
regulation and that the regulations adopted were narrowly tailored to achieve the
governmental interest. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-
75 (2002) (prohibitions on campaign speech by judicial candidates violate the First
Amendment).
22. The OGE rules as promulgated required an agency to adopt new rules
regarding any prior approval requirements, revoking any existing agency rules a
year after the effective date of the OGE rules. 57 Fed. Reg. 35,006 (Aug. 7, 1992).
23. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.807(a) (2001). Expenses in connection with such activity
may be reimbursed. § 2635.807(a)(2)(iii)(D). Criminal liability also attaches to a
federal government employee who receives any reimbursement from any source
Fall 2005
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limit compensation for outside speeches or writing for related activity
to reimbursement of expenses; for example, expenses to attend a
conference at which the employee may be speaking in an unofficial
capacity.
The OGE rules do permit prior approval of certain activities if an
agency has promulgated such rules.24 SSA failed to adopt or propose
such rules until now, although another agency, the Department of the
Interior, has done so.25 Instead, it appears that the SSA and its ALJs
informally continue to apply the provisions of an ethics handbook
issued in 1989 which do refer to prior approval in certain situations.26
One can certainly argue that the passage of more than a decade with
no examples of improper activity by ALJs suggests that these
proposed rules are superfluous and unnecessary.
The SSA proposed rules apply to a far broader set of activities
than those covered by OGE rules. Outside employment is covered
whether or not there is compensation and whether or not any
relatedness to government employment exists.27 Speeches, writings,
editing, and assuming membership on boards or groups, such as a
planning commission, are also covered.28 Federal ALJs would be
automatically subjected to these proposed rules since the rules apply
to any provision of consultative or professional services, even if
other than authorized governments for performing their governmental services. 18
U.S.C. § 209 (2000).
24. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.803 (2005). Such supplemental regulations must be issued
subsequent to February 3, 1993. Id.
25. The Department of Interior requires prior approval for outside
employment. 5 C.F.R. § 3501.105(b) (2005). "Approval shall be granted unless a
determination is made that the outside employment is expected to involve conduct
is prohibited by statute or Federal regulation." § 3501.105 (b)(3) (emphasis added).
26. Teaching, lecturing, writing, and editing is encouraged, but advance
approval is required if the institution does business with an ALJ's office. 5 C.F.R.
§ 3501.105(b). If the writing or editing activity relates to the ALJ's office, prior
approval is required and certain disclaimers are also required. An Ethics Handbook
for Employees of the Department of Health and Human Services 30 (June 1989).
Such prior requirements were grandfathered in by the 1992 Regulations for one
year. 57 Fed. Reg. at 35,062.
27. Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Social
Security Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 7192 (proposed Feb. 11, 2005) (to be
codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102).
28. See id.
25-2
provided to certain enumerated nonprofit groups.29  All attorney
ALJs are obviously professionals trained in the law.
Prior approval is required for any activity, whether paid or not,
whether related to government employment or not.3" A submission
must be made to the AL's superior who has broad discretion to
approve or disapprove the request with neither a requirement that
reasons for denial be cited nor any requirement that the superior act
in a timely or expeditious manner. 31 No requirement for judicial
review is built into the prior approval system. 3
2
The reasons stated for the proposed rules are quite general, 33 and,
with respect to ALJs, most rules specifically refer only to attempts to
preserve the appearance of impartiality and fairness.
34
29. See id. (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102(d)). No enumeration of
permitted nonprofits is contained in the proposed rule. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. The most specific part of the prior approval system is the detailed
nature of the list of items to be contained in a request and the requirement that
approval be sought thirty days or more prior to the speech, writing, editing, or
joining. Id.
33. The listed reasons include the following:
1. Fear that participation in outside employment or other outside
activities would adversely affect operations within the employing
component; or
2. Place the employee at risk of violating applicable statutes and
regulations governing employee conduct.
3. The prior approval requirement is deemed necessary to
preclude the appearance that outside employment or other outside
activity may have been obtained through the use of the
employee's official position;
4. And to address a number of other potential ethical concerns.
5. The SSA annually provides millions of dollars of funding in
SSA grants, contracts, etc., and the SSA has determined prior
approval before participating in such activity is critical to
protecting against questions regarding impartiality or objectivity
of employees and the administration of SSA programs.
Id. In sum, SSA is concerned with the use of SSA public position or connections
to inure to private gain.
34. See id.
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II. THE PROPOSED RULES: THE OMITTED
Not one reference in the proposed rules specifically indicates that
the current rules already prohibit employment for gain. Nor do the
proposed rules reference or exempt communications approved by 5
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), including disclosure of information the
employee reasonably believes evidences a violation of the law or
rules, gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of
authority, or a substantial danger to the public health or safety. 35 No
reference is even made to disclosures to Congress. 36 No specific
references are made to examples of past improper actions by ALJs.37
No suggestion is made that SSA ALJs have anything to do with
grant making or other similar activity involving SSA dispensing
funds for research, contract, or other such purposes.38
III. THE PROPOSED RULES: POLICY QUESTIONS
Among other important public policy questions posed by the
rules, are the following: Should ALJs be required, on penalty of
possible disciplinary action, to refrain from speaking in public about
the 911 attack on the following days and weeks? Should they be
prohibited from speaking out on the killings of Federal District Judge
Joan Lefkow's husband and mother for a minimum of thirty days
after the shootings? Should they be prohibited from testifying to
Congress or a congressional committee absent prior clearance with
thirty days notice? Must a whistleblower ALJ receive prior approval
before disclosing corruption, ineptitude, or the ordinary bureaucratic
foul-ups of the SSA? Questions such as these are serious matters not
addressed by the proposed rules.
35. "[I]f such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such
information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interests of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs." 5 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(8) (2000).
36. See id. § 2302(b). "This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the
withholding of information from the Congress or the taking of any personnel action
against an employee who discloses information to the Congress." Id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
The proposed rules apply broadly to all employees of SSA,
including persons appointed and serving as ALJs within SSA.39 Such
employees are prohibited from "engaging in consultative, or
professional services, for compensation * ,*'0 Prior written
approval from SSA is required for all such consultative or
professional service activity whether or not engaged in for
compensation."a Prohibited outside employment or activities are
specifically defined to include engaging in consultative or
professional services, for compensation, and to prepare or assist in
the preparation of any grant applications, contract proposals,
programs reports, or other documents that are intended for
submission to SSA.a2
Such prohibitions might be unobjectionable if it were completely
possible to understand the concept of "employment which doesn't
involve compensation." Since executive branch-wide standards
already prohibit "conflicting outside employment" under 5 C.F.R. §
2635.802(a), it is unclear why additional rules are being proposed
unless the agency intends to seriously implement the "prior approval"
aspects of the proposed rules.4 3 Certainly, ALJs already risk serious
sanctions if they engage in any type of outside employment for pay
related to their SSA work.4 4
39. 70 Fed. Reg. 7192 (proposed Feb. 11, 2005) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. §
9101.102).
40. Id. (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102(c)). However, activity such as
writing and speaking, even if engaged in on an uncompensated basis, while not
expressly prohibited, would still be subjected to prior approval requirements
discussed below. Id. (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102(d)). The proposed rule
defines employment quite broadly as the provision of personal services whether or
not for compensation (including self-employment). Id. Later on, the same
proposed rule extends its provisions to SSA employees "[p]roviding services to a
non-Federal entity." Id. (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102(d)(iii)). In effect,
membership is also restricted whenever an ALJs professional advice might be
useful, regardless of whether conflicts of interest with SSA related activity might
be involved. Id.
41. Id. (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102(d)).
42. Id. (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. 9101.102(c)) (even if undertaken without
compensation, such work must still be approved in writing prior to such activity).
43. See id.
44. See id.
Fall 2005 Muzzling and Caging Administrative Law Judges
438 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-2
However, the proposed rules go much further and require prior
approval not only for "employment and consultative activity," but
also for:
[E]ngaging in teaching, speaking, writing, or editing...
[or] providing services to a non-Federal entity as an
officer, director, or board member, or as a member of a
group such as a planning commission advisory council,
editorial board, scientific or technical advisory board,
or panel, which require the provision of advice,
counsel, or consultation .... 45
Such prior approval must be secured by providing at least thirty
days ahead of time a set of information to the employee's immediate
supervisor. 46 However, the proposed rules do not mention a time
frame within which the immediate supervisor, or any other SSA
employee, must make a decision regarding the grant of written
permission.47  The "standard for permission" involves a
45. Id. That is "unless the service is provided without compensation to a non-
profit charitable, religious, professional, social, fraternal, educational, recreational,
public service or civic organization" and does not involve the provision of
professional or consultative services. Id.
46. The required information includes the following: A) the "employee's
name, organizational component, position, title, grade and salary;" B) the "nature
of the proposed outside employment or other outside activity, including a full
description of the specific duties or services to be performed;" C) a "description of
the employee's official duties that relate in any way to the proposed activity;" D)
the "name and address of the person or organization for whom or with which the
work or activity will be done, including the location where the services will be
performed;" E) the "estimated total time that will be devoted to the activity,"
including a "statement of the estimate of number of hours per year and a statement
of the anticipated beginning and ending date;" F) a "statement as to whether the
work can be performed entirely outside of the employee's regular duty hours," G)
the "method or basis of compensation" if any; H) a "statement as to whether the
compensation is derived from" any SSA source; I) for activities involving the
provision of professional or consultative services a statement as to whether to
person or entity receiving the services is receiving or intends to seek SSA or
federal government benefits, contracts, grants, etc, for "activities involving the
provision of professional and consultative services;" and J) a disclaimer of the
absence of SSA endorsement or support for the speech, writing, etc., for proposed
writing, speaking, and editing unless a form disclaimer is included. Id.
47. See id.
determination that the outside employment or activity is not expected
to involve conduct prohibited by statute or regulation including both
the instant rules as well as 5 C.F.R. § 2635 (which involves general
standards of ethical conduct applicable to most employees of the
executive branch).48
The proposed rules thus have at their core a requirement of a
specific written request, provided thirty days in advance, to an SSA's
immediate superior.49 That superior is apparently designated with the
power and duty to decide on some unstated time frame whether to
grant permission or not. 50 No provision is made for appeals within
the agency against a negative decision, nor are there any provisions
for judicial review. 51 So far as the proposed rule is concerned, the
immediate superior is vested with virtually unconstrained power to
censor, on a time frame of their own whim, with no regard for
considerations of consistency.
5 2
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Against this confused scheme of regulation of outside
employment activity (where payment is deemed irrelevant by the
definition sections) and other speaking, writing or membership
activity, what principles apply to protect ALJs, who are qualified
professionals trained in the law?
The answer is deceptively simple: All First Amendment
protections regarding speech, the press, and association apply.
Speech by public employees is constitutionally protected. No
administrative agency can completely prohibit it. A complex
balancing test has been applied by the Supreme Court to determine
48. Id. (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102(d)(4)). The proposed rules do
provide for the possibility of the issuance of instructions or manuals that would
specify the procedures governing submission and containing examples of permitted
and non-permitted activities. Id. (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102(d)(5)). The
proposed rule references the possibility of an agency designating an agency ethics
official or designee. Id.
49. Id. (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102(d)).
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
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whether public employees could be regulated. 53 Even in the context
of paid speech, blanket bans on such speech are scrutinized carefully,
and the government is obliged to justify restrictions with
particularized, and adequate reasons.
Limits upon governmental employee membership with civic,
political, and other associations also implicate First Amendment
concerns
V. LIMITS ON BANNING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SPEECH
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme
Court limited the ability of public school boards to dismiss a teacher
for public speech criticizing the school system. 54 The majority
opinion rejected the idea that teachers forfeited their First
Amendment rights when they became public school teachers.55 As
the Court stated, "[T]he threat of dismissal from public employment
is nonetheless a potent means of inhibiting speech. 56 Nor do federal
ALJs forfeit their First Amendment rights when they become ALJs.
While Connick v. Meyers recognized the possibility that an
employee can engage in unprotected speech activity if the speech is
unrelated to matters involving political, social or other concerns of
the community, Connick still limited the ability of any branch of
government to muzzle governmental employees. 57 The Court in
Connick grounded its decision on the "long standing recognition that
the First Amendment's primary aim is the full protection of speech
53. The balancing test consists of two parts: First, courts must determine
whether the employee's speech can be fairly characterized as constituting speech
on a matter of public concern; and second, the employee's right to free speech must
be balanced against the interests of the state. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138,
146, 150 (1983). The particularized balance test is described by the Court as
difficult and one in which the Supreme Court is compelled to make an independent
constitutional judgment on the facts. See id. at 150 n. 10.
54. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 574. "[A]bsent proof of false statements, knowingly or recklessly
made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for dismissal from public employment." Id.
57. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
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upon issues of public concern, as well as the practical realities
involved in the administration of a government office."'58
Pickering and its progeny require the application of a rather
complex balancing test. It would be quite surprising were the
ordinary "superior" employee in the SSA to have any background or
skill in the application of such balancing tests. The Court's statement
in Pickering and repeated in Connick, that it was neither feasible nor
appropriate to lay down a general standard against which all such
statements should be judged,59 constitutes a broad caution against the
SSA initiative reflected in the proposed rules.
Serious attention must be paid to the value of speech in the
context of our deep respect for free speech. For example, in Rankin
v. McPherson, the Supreme Court held it improper to dismiss a
public employee just because the employee stated, after an attempted
assassination of President Reagan, "If they go for him again, I hope
they get him.",60 Respect for free speech means respect for speech we
detest.
VI. THE BALANCING TEST APPLIES EVEN TO REGULATION OF PAID
SPEECH BY GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES
Broad bans upon paid speech for public employees are suspect.
61
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU"),
the Court noted that federal employees while so employed by the
federal government wrote literary masterpieces, including writers
such as Nathanial Hawthorne, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman, and
Bret Harte. 6
2
In NTEU the Court invalidated executive branch bans on the
receipt of particular honorariums under the rules and regulations
issued by the Office of Government Ethics pursuant to 5 C.F.R. §§
2306.201 et seq. While the Court normally accords a stronger
presumption of validity to congressional judgments than to an
individual disciplinary action, the widespread impact of the honoraria
ban, "gives rise to far more serious concerns than could any single
58. Id. at 154.
59. Id. (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569).
60. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380 (1987).
61. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995)
62. Id. at 464-65.
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supervisory decision." 63  The Court then examined in detail the
justifications for placing the honorarium ban on nearly 1.7 million
executive branch employees 64 in the absence of any evidence of
misconduct related to honoraria in the vast rank and file of federal
employees below GS-16.65 While the honorarium ban at issue in
NTEU concerned speech unrelated to government employment, in
partial distinction to the proposed rules banning outside employment
related to matters such as grant submission to SSA, 6 6 the complexity
of the balancing test as applied by the Supreme Court is daunting. In
NTEU the Court considered the limited evidence of alleged or actual
impropriety by legislators and high-level executives, 67 including
abuses by members of Congress, 68 as compared to the scant harm
were an employee of the Mint to lecture on the Quaker religion or
write dance reviews. 69 The Court was particularly concerned that
63. Id. at 468.
64. Id. at 474.
65. Id. at 472. Today federal ALJs are no longer compensated on the GS scale.
See Pub. L. No. 101-509, § 104(a), 104 Stat. 1389, 1445-46 (1990) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2000)) (establishing separate pay schedule for
administrative law judges). Although when the scale did apply to ALJs, some were
classified at the GS-15 level and others at the GS-16 level. See 56 Fed. Reg. 6208,
6210 (Feb. 14, 1991) (listing different GS grades of administrative law judges
including GS-15 and GS-16 grades). The reason reference is made in NTEU to the
GS- 16 level is that Congress had earlier traded off a ban on receiving compensation
for outside activity related to government service in return for increasing
compensation to GS-16 and above government employees. See NTEU, 513 U.S. at
458-59.
66. 70 Fed. Reg. 7192, 7192-93 (proposed Feb. 11, 2005) (to be codified at 5
C.F.R. § 9101.102). The definition section of the proposed rule, § 102(c), defines
prohibited Outside Employment and Other Activity as:
[E]ngaging in consultative or professional services, for
compensation, to prepare, or assist in the preparation of, any
grant applications, contract proposals, program reports, or other
documents that are intended for submission to SSA. Note that
such conduct, if undertaken on any uncompensated basis, thought
not expressly prohibited by proposed paragraph (c) would be
subject to the prior approval requirement in proposed paragraph
(d).
67. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 472.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 473.
expressive activity was singled out for special regulation,7 ° and
emphasized that it was the government's burden to demonstrate that
the "harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation
will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.,
71
In contrast, the justifications for the proposed rules cite no
particular instances of actual harm. The stated justification for the
proposed rules are that the SSA annually provides millions of dollars
of funding through grants, contracts, cooperative research and
development agreements and other funding relationships. 72  No
specific relationship is required between any particular SSA
employee, including ALJs, and the provision of such funds, before
the ban on "employment" applies. 73  Pre-clearance of speaking
engagements and writing and editing uniformly applies.74
SSA further states that it is concerned that reasonable persons
might be concerned that SSA employees having employment
relationships (without mentioning speaking and writing) might
compromise their impartiality and objectivity.75 No attempt is made
to connect the responsibilities of SSA ALJs who decide social
security disability cases to any speech related activity or indeed any
employment-related activity whatsoever. While SSA asserts that
ALJs are the most visible SSA employees to the public, the reality is
that citizens are five times more likely to have contact with other
SSA employees than they are to have contact with ALJs.
76
70. Id. at 475.
71. Id. (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 664
(1994)).
72. 70 Fed. Reg. 7192, 7193 (proposed Feb. 11, 2005) (to be codified at 5
C.F.R. § 9101.102).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 7192.
76. Comments of the Association of Administrative Law Judges International
Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, AFL-CIO (Judicial Council 1)
Regarding Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Supplemental Standards of Ethical
Conduct for Employees of the social Security Administration 13 n.15 (filed Mar.
14, 2005) (hereinafter Comments), available at http://policy.ssa.gov/erm/rules.nsf/
(follow "Search" hyperlink). Four million claims are filed each year in social
security district offices, while ALJs decide about 700,000 cases a year. "Assuming
an equal number of District Office visits to request information as claims filed, the
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Would an AU be at risk were she to encourage a storefront
church to apply for faith-based initiative funds (were they available)
from SSA for a project to enhance public awareness of the social
security programs? Would a speech related to the same topic without
pre-clearance pose problems with objectivity and/or impartiality?
Were ALJs involved in the provision of grant monies and/or
contracts from SSA, a conflict issue might arise that justified
additional regulation. The proposed rules, however, make no case
for such needed regulations. Indeed, existent rules contained in 5
C.F.R. pt. 2635 already incorporate a ban for activities such as
teaching, speaking, and writing where the employee will receive
compensation if such activity "relates to the employee's official
duties."77 Thus the ALJs use of his or her public office for private
gain already has been banned.
The proposed rules, nevertheless, subject all employment
(regardless of compensation) and outside activities, to prior approval
requirements. Such pre-clearance requirements would apparently
cover most of the activities used as examples of permitted activity in
5 C.F.R. § 2635.807(a) to illustrate that rule's impact on outside
activities.78  For example, an AU speaking on the law of stamp
collecting now would be covered, as would an AU who wrote an
article about making clear presentations in social security hearings or
drafted a guide to navigating the complexities of the social security
application process. Receipt of payment for the last two of these
activities already would be prohibited by 5 C.F.R. § 2635.807(a), but
payment for the speech would not be prohibited. The proposed rule
would uniformly require pre-clearance for each activity, regardless of
compensation.
Covered activity includes the provision of professional or
consultative services, including service as an expert witness. 79 No
condition appears to be attached to such activity liking coverage to a
inescapable conclusion is that the 'notorious' face of SSA best known to the public
is the District Office information clerk or claims manager." Id.
77. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.807(a) (2005).
78. An explanatory note after the text of the section illustrates the application
of the ban of section 2635.807(a)(2)(i)(E) gives nine examples. 5 C.F.R. §
2653.807.
79. 70 Fed. Reg. at 7195 (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 9101.102(d)).
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relationship to an AL's official duties. 0 Pre-clearance would thus
also be required for an ALJ asked to draft a will for a female soldier
about to ship out to Iraq, since such activity would be professional.
Covered activity also includes teaching, speaking, writing, or editing
that relates to an AL's official duties within the meaning of 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635.807 (a)(2)(i)(B) through (E).A Were an ALJ to discover and
wish to speak about serious corruption and bribery in the social
security district office, pre-clearance would apply. Indeed, pre-
clearance would apply were the "corruption" to be that of the
immediate superior of the ALJ (i.e. the person required to give pre-
clearance authority under the proposed rule).
Such a case has already been heard by the United States Supreme
Court (involving, however, neither the SSA, nor any ALJ). In Arnett
v. Kennedy, the Court considered due process and free speech-related
issues regarding an Office of Economic Opportunity employee who
complained about bribery by his immediate supervisor.8 2 The
supervisor then discharged the employee. The employee's appeal
from such discharge was to the supervisor complained about who had
just discharged him. 83
VII. PRIOR RESTRAINT WITHOUT PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS TO
PROTECT SPEECH INTERESTS
United States constitutional law contains a strong prohibition
against prior restraints upon speech or writings. 84 The Court in Near
v. Minnesota held unconstitutional an injunction prohibiting
publication of a scurrilous newspaper. In New York Times v. United
States, an injunction against publishing the Pentagon Papers was
similarly held improper despite purported interests in national
security.85  In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, the Court
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
83. Id. at 197. Ultimately in a multiplicity of opinions with no majority
opinion, the Court found no constitutional violations. Id. at 164.
84. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); N.Y. Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (Pentagon Papers case); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976) (fair trial issues).
85. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
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severely curtailed the possibility of judicially imposed gag orders for
criminal trials, rejecting a pre-trial ban on publishing confessions or
statements or other matter "strongly implicative" of the accused,
despite the state's claim it was protecting the accused's right to a fair
trial.86
However, the proposed rules mandate a thirty-day pre-clearance
period for any speeches and writings by an ALJ of any sort,
apparently without limitation to content or subject matter, and only in
the context of the vaguest expressed governmental interests.
8 7
Facially, the proposed rules are unconstitutional as prior
restraints, to say nothing about their serious problems with vagueness
and susceptibility to arbitrary enforcement. No explicit justification
is proffered based upon some need for initial notice to SSA of the
content of speeches or writings.88
VIII. PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES
Public-issue related speech "occupies the highest rung of
hierarchy of First Amendment values and is entitled to special
protection." 89 The protections of appropriate procedures are central
to applicable Supreme Court decisions.
For example, the Supreme Court has held that any censor must
work in a system that makes available a rapid, certain, resort to
judicial review.90 Nowhere do the proposed rules provide for
prompt, or, indeed, any judicial review, nor do the rules require that a
86. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 541, 542, 570.
87. Section 2635.807 conditions its application upon activity that relates to the
official duty of the employee. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.807 (2005). In contrast, the
proposed rule sweeps into its ambit any professional or consultative services. 70
Fed. Reg. 28 (proposed Feb. 11, 2005). It is also not limited to matter that relates
to official duties within the meaning of 5 C.F.R. § 2635.807(a)(2)(i)(B)-(E),
although such activities are also covered regardless of compensation. 70 Fed. Reg.
28 (proposed Feb. 11, 2005).
88. Compare with Barnard v. Jackson County, 43 F.3d 1218, 1222-25 (8th Cir.
1995) where a county legislative body had adopted an ordinance that an auditor
should first notify it of audit results before releasing the audit results to third
parties. Id. Violating this requirement was held not to infringe on the auditor's
first amendment rights. Id. at 1225.
89. Id. at 1225 (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1982)).
90. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (State Board of Censors
required to seek prompt judicial review).
decision must be made within a day, a week, a month, or even a year.
Thus, the proposed rules are comparable with those struck down in
Freedman v. Maryland, which imposed no time limit for completion
of action by the Board of Censors.91 As was the case in Freedman,
there is no provision for judicial participation in the procedure.92 The
argument in Freedman (that review by the Board of Censors, if made
unduly onerous by reason of delay or otherwise, makes the Board's
determination final) is just as applicable under the proposed rules.93
In Freedman, the Court placed the burden of proving that a film was
unprotected speech on the Board of Censors.94 Advance submission
requirements could not be administered in a manner that lends an
effect of finality to the censor's determination. 95 Moreover, within a
specified, brief time, the Board must either issue the license sought or
petition a court for an order to restrain the film.96 Any interim
restraint imposed must be for the shortest time period compatible
with prompt judicial review. 97 The procedures provided must assure
prompt final judicial review to minimize the deterrent effect of an
interim, and possibly erroneous, denial of a license.
98
The proposed rules contain nothing that in the slightest way
comports with the Freedman requirements. In contrast to the
Freedman Court, which displays considerable concern over potential
chills of protected expression, the proposed rules simply ignore the
issue.
91. Id. at 55.
92. Id.
93. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. The Freedman Court was particularly
concerned with judicial review of the initial Board of Censors decision, in part
because the business of the Board of Censor is to censor. This means that the
censor may be particularly insensitive to First Amendment interests, especially as
contrasted with the independent branch of the judiciary. Id. at 57-58. Under the
proposed rules, it can be argued, the business of the SSA is to make their superiors
content, and no particular concern with First Amendment considerations forms part
of the SSA mandate.
94. Id. at 55.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 59.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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IX. PRIOR RESTRAINTS REGARDING MEMBERSHIP
One of the most puzzling aspects of the rules is their extension to
require thirty-day advance notice of membership in various groups.99
SSA advances no specific or particularized justification for this part
of the proposed rules.
In Keyshian v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court invalidated
provisions of invalidated provisions of New York's Feinberg Law
that made Communist Party membership prima facie evidence of
disqualification from the public school systems of New York.100
Mere knowing membership, without specific intent to further the
unlawful aims of the Communist Party, was held not to be a
constitutionally inadequate basis for discharge of a schoolteacher.'
0
'
Further, such knowing membership alone cannot justify criminal
penalties 0 2 or disbarment.10 3
The proposed rules require no specific mental state or intent
whatsoever regarding group membership.0 4 Prior approval is always
required, even to lead a Cub Scout troop.'0 5
There is only the vaguest notion in the proposed rules as to what
standards a superior must follow when adjudicating membership in
groups or assisting organizations to which an ALJ might render
99. The requirement applies to:
[P]roviding services to a non-Federal entity as an officer,
director, or board member, or as a member of a group such as...
unless the service is provided, without compensation other than
reimbursement of expenses, to a nonprofit charitable, religious,
professional, social, fraternal, educational, recreational, public
service or civic organization and does not involve the provision
of professional or consultative services ....
70. Fed. Reg. 28 (proposed Feb. 11, 2005). Providing legal advice about the
likelihood of a tort suit about playground equipment to a public park district
apparently touches off the prior approval requirement.
100. Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 606
(1967).
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)).
103. Id. at 606; Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
104. See 70 Fed. Reg. 7192 (proposed Feb. 11, 2005).
105. Id.
professional advice. 10 6 Once again, this presents serious prior
restraint issues.
No American case appears to deal with the specific issue of a
judge's ability to join a particular group. However, the European
Court of Human Rights has ruled in just such a case. In Maestri v.
Italy, ' 7 the court held that inflicting disciplinary measures on an
Italian judge because of his membership in the Order of Masons
violated his freedom of association rights under article 11 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.1' 8 The court determined
that during the period of membership it could not have been
foreseeable to the judge that membership in a non-secret order of
Freemasons could give rise to disciplinary action. 109 A law enacted
in 1982 provided that membership in a secret society was a criminal
offense and that disciplinary measures could be taken against civil
servants and judges. " 0 The lodge judge Maestri belonged to was not
secret; indeed, it made its membership list public, contrary to the
practice of other Italian associations such as political parties and
trade unions.'
106. Id.
107. Maestri v. Italy, [2004] ECHR 39748/98 (17 February 2004).
108. Article 11 - Freedom of Assembly and Association:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form
and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights
other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition
of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members
of the armed forces, or the police or of the administration of the
State.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 11,
Nov. 11, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
109. Maestri, [2004] ECHR 39748/98 at 37-42.
110. Id. at 20. The law can be traced back to a "notorious" P2 lodge which
planned to take control of public authorities and subvert democratic institutions. Id.
at 12. The P2 lodge had colluded with the Mafia and organized crime. Id. at 13.
111. According to Judge Maestri's submission to the court: "Moreover,
Freemasonry was not a paramilitary organization and pursued purely cultural,
humanitarian and philanthropic aims." Id. at 28.
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For a government to fear judicial participation in Mafia
controlled organizations is unsurprising, just as New York State
feared participation by school teachers in communist controlled
organizations. However, the SSA has not even hinted at suspicion
that ALJs have belonged to, belong to, or are thinking about joining
Mafia front organizations or any similar group.
The pre-clearance procedure would apply, for example, to
membership on the board of directors of a condominium association
where the ALJ resides. Such boards must often concern themselves
with legal issues, such as easements, trespass, or rights to tuckpoint
common walls. 112 The European Court of Human Rights predicated
its decision on lack of notice.11 3 Under the proposed rules, it would
appear there would be notice since negative responses to requests for
permission would presumably be communicated to the ALJ. That
still leaves the possibility of both prior restraint and prior restraint in
the context of vague and overbroad standards.
The United States Supreme Court has condemned the
requirement of "official approval under laws that delegated
standardless discretionary power to local functionaries, resulting in
virtually unreviewable prior restraints on First Amendment rights."
'
" 
4
The proposed rule requires approval to be given "only upon a
determination that the outside employment or activity is not expected
to involve conduct prohibited by statute or Federal regulation,
including 5 CFR part 2635 and this part."' 1 5 It appears reasonable to
construe the roving commission of the ALJs superior implicates the
112. While it may seem a stretch, in theory, every owner of a condominium is,
by definition, a member of the condominium association. The literal text of the
proposed rules would appear to require prior approval for an ALJ contemplating
purchasing a condominium, and immediate requests for permission to continue
living in a condominium where the ALJ and her family currently reside.
113. See Maestri, [2004] ECHR 39748/98 at 37.
114. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). The Court cited
various First Amendment cases regarding such unpermitted broad discretionary
prior restraints: Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (permit
required for public demonstration); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 553-58 (1965)
(parade permit ordinance invalidated on its face); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951) (permit from the police commissioner required prior to speaking on a public
street); and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (prior written permission
required to distribute literature).
115. Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Social
Security Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 7192, 7195 (Feb. 11, 2005).
entire ambit of federal statutory law. The proposed rules impose no
time limit on granting or denying approval; nor do the rules require
the decision to be in writing or contain any reasons.116 Disapproval
could be expressed orally and without stated reasons.'
17
No United States Supreme Court decision specifically addresses
the application of prior restraint "membership" rules to either judges
or to SSA ALJs. But the intense, careful review that the Court has
applied in related areas does not suggest that these proposed rules are
constitutional. Most importantly, the failure of the SSA to identify
particular abuses related to membership activity of ALJs is a serious
failure in the proposed rules under the traditional balancing test
described above. 18
X. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
ON JUDGES AND ALJs
The Supreme Court recently applied the strict scrutiny standard
of review while reviewing restrictions on judicial candidate speeches.
Strict scrutiny requires that the government identify a compelling
state interest and adopt narrowly tailored regulations to achieve that
purpose.' 19 In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Court
recognized that the subject matter of the regulation, political speech
of persons campaigning for public office, was "'at the core of our
First Amendment freedoms."" 20
Comments from ALJs on matters relating to their public
employment would likely be accorded high protection as well,
although the Court in Pickering specifically declined to lay down a
general standard against which all governmental employee
statements may be judged. 12  It is likely, for example, that
distinctions might be made. For example, speech criticizing
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
119. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002).
120. Id. at 774 (citation omitted).
121. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968), cited in Connick v.
Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). "[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or
feasible . . . to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may
be judged." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
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superiors, the subject in Pickering and Connick, might receive
somewhat lesser review, and speech relating to the SSA program
itself might be accorded higher protection.
The proposed rules draw no distinctions between different
subjects of the speech. No distinction, for example, is made between
job-related speech in which the personal interests of the speaker are
also involved, and job-related speech in which no personal interests
of the speaker are involved. Indeed, the rules lump together speech
that is employment-related and speech that is not employment-
related.
The Court's decision in NTEU invalidating restrictions on
honoraria paid to governmental employees for matters unrelated to
governmental employment is authority that a higher burden is
imposed on government than in either Pickering or Connick before
non-employment-related speech, editing, or association can be
curtailed. 122  In addition, as discussed above, the prior restraint
system itself may require stronger justification than any that has been
suggested as of yet. Indeed, the Court in NTEU cited Near v.
Minnesota in the same paragraph where it articulated the "greater
burden" test for the proposition that "this ban chills potential speech
before it happens." 123
In NTEU, the Court also identified the level of burden upon the
covered employees in relationship to their likelihood of appearing
and speaking. The denial of compensation was seen as "inevitably
diminish[ing] their expressive output.' ' 124  In addition, the Court
noted "[t]he large-scale disincentive to Government employees'
expression also imposes a significant burden on the public's right to
122. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468
(1995) ("NTEU").
123. Id.
124. Id. at 470. This is particularly evident when contrasted with officials such
as legislators and policymaking executives or other high-ranking officials who
often receive invitations to appear and talk about their official responsibilities. An
honoraria ban is unlikely to impede speech by the latter groups, so long as they
receive travel reimbursement for the speaker and one relative as "an alternative
form of remuneration." Id. at 469. Also, "[i]n contrast, invitations to rank-and-file
employees usually depend only on the market value of their messages." Id. at 469-
70.
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read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and
said."125
On the other side, in NTEU, the Government asserted an interest
in avoiding immediate workplace disruption, as in Pickering, or
interference with the efficiency of public service. In response to the
Government's claimed justification through Public Workers v.
Mitchell, the case proceeding the passage of the Hatch Act,' 2 6 the
Court stated that the Hatch Act was aimed at protecting employees'
rights, most notably their rights to free expression. The Hatch Act
eliminated the possibility of pressure to vote or perform political
chores to curry favor with superiors rather than acting on their own
beliefs. 27  The Court failed to see how honoraria threatened
employees' morale or liberty. 128  Speeches on non-employment-
related topics rarely would threaten workplace harmony.
In NTEU, the Government also advanced as a justification fear of
misuse (or appearance of misuse) of governmental power by the
acceptance of compensation for speaking or writing. 129 However, the
failure to identify evidence of misconduct by the rank-and-file
employee related to honoraria meant that extension of the ban to such
employees was unreasonable. 3 ° Predicating such an extension, as
the Government did in NTEU, upon the misdeeds of some legislators
and high-level executives, simply was not proper.131
In the supporting rationale for the proposed rules, as discussed
above, no examples of ALJ misconduct were cited. The Government
did raise a general concern with fairness. In Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, the lower court had identified as compelling
125. Id. at 470.
126. Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (curtailing political activity
of federal employees) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (limits on partisan political
activity by all classified federal employees)).
127. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 471.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 470.
130. Id. at 472.
131. Id. In a footnote, the Court noted that a General Accounting Office report
cited by the government to bolster its case, in its 112 pages, contained not one
example of any real or apparent impropriety related to a lower-level employee or to
any employee engaged in writing, speaking, or any other conduct unrelated to his
or her government job. Id. at 472 n.18.
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interests the preservation and appearance of impartiality.'
1 32
However, the Court found the word "impartiality" to be an undefined
term, although it is frequently used in briefs, as well as by the lower
court, the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, and the ABA Codes
of Judicial Conduct. None of these sources bothered to define it, and
the Court needed clarity on this point before it could announce
whether impartiality was a compelling state interest and if so,
whether the rule at issue was narrowly-tailored to achieve it.13 3 The
Court then went on to consider several possible meanings of
impartiality, including as regards a particular party before the Court,
or with respect to a particular legal view, or open-mindedness.
34
The challenged rule was found not to be sufficiently narrowly-
tailored to serve impartiality in the party sense, because it restricts
speech for or against particular issues. 135 As far as issues of law are
concerned, the Court found no compelling state interest implicated,
"since avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal issues is neither
possible nor desirable, pretending otherwise by attempting to
preserve the 'appearance' of that type of impartiality can hardly be a
compelling state interest., 136 The last justification, related to "open-
mindedness" was not one that the Court thought the Minnesota
Supreme Court had adopted; if applicable, it was "so woefully
underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the
credulous."' 13
7
The proposed SSA rules contain no more specific justification
than those rejected in Republican Party of Minnesota. As such, the
proposed rules are indeed suspect.
XI. Conclusion
While there may be laudable goals in restraining outside paid
employment by ALJs, the issue has already been addressed by rules
that are executive branch-wide and do not single out "notorious"
ALJs. The proposed rules sweep far beyond the permissible range of
132. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 775-84.
135. Id. at 776.
136. Id. at 778.
137. Id. at 780.
regulation into a constitutional wasteland of problems, including
matters of prior restraint, vagueness, over breadth, and a virtual total
lack of particularized justification.
At a minimum, the proposed rules should be fundamentally
revised, with far more justification for these rules needed. Unless
such a forceful justification is forthcoming, it would probably be
better to abandon the entire project and let the ordinary rules of
judicial conduct regulate SSA ALJs. 138  If a need can be
demonstrated, perhaps some parts of these proposed rules might be
re-proposed regarding other SSA employees.
138. The extensive and well-reasoned comments filed with SSA by the union
representing ALJs contain a thorough analysis of the application of professional
rules already applicable to ALJs. See Comments, supra note 76.
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